Summary. The spread of terrorism is a serious concern in national and international security, as its spread is seen as an existential threat to Western liberal democracies. Understanding and effectively modelling the spread of terrorism provides useful insight into formulating effective responses. A mathematical model capturing the theoretical constructs of contagion and diffusion is constructed for explaining the spread of terrorist activity and used to analyse data from the Global Terrorism Database from 2000-2016 for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel. Results show that the model identifies patterns in the diffusion and contagion processes that align with and provide insight into contemporary events.
Introduction
Terrorism is a complicated social phenomenon, and assessing the effectiveness of measures to prevent the spread or increase in the rate of terrorist events relies on a model that incorporates a qualitative and theoretical understanding of the process while maintaining fidelity to the data, hence accurately reflecting the effects of counter-measures. This paper presents such a model, it incorporates an accepted theoretical framework and refined elements of previous quantitative models and is parametrised to allow the extraction of meaningful insights from the results.
There are two aspects to acts of terrorism † that exacerbate their impact. The first is their relative rarity (in most contexts), the second is that the clustering of events in time [47, 48, 32, 49, 36, 71, 75, 43, 5] creates the impression of a sudden increase in the rate of terrorism. It is the uncertainty surrounding the permanence of this increase that causes additional anxiety [72, 38, 13, 14, 1] . Determining whether the occurrence of a terrorist event is a transient anomaly or a signal of a change in the rate of events is of great interest and identifying the circumstances around these two possibilities is a feature of the model presented in this paper. Theoretical models posit the mechanisms of contagion and diffusion as explanations for these patterns of clustering and erratic activity. Each of these mechanisms has different implications for identifying whether events are part of an increase in the rate of events or are part of a transient anomaly.
Sociological theories to explain aberrant behaviour through contagion or diffusion ‡ begin with [46] , and appear in discussions of political violence and civil upheaval by the mid-twentieth century [37] , enduring as a viable theoretical model for the spread of terrorism [48, 57, 49, 27, 33, 36, 77, 24, 7, 8, 6, 10] . The mathematical and statistical concept of a "contagious" process is similarly well established [23, 54, 19] and the application of a model based approach to describing the theoretical dynamics of terrorism via social diffusion emerges in the social sciences with [12] , followed by the development of theoretically based models [57, 16, 26, 27] . These models build on theoretical constructs concerning social contagion, diffusion, and group learning demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the theories and mathematical models but focus on a single mechanism to explain the spread of violence. Contemporary to these models the Hawkes self-exciting process model [30, 29] and its cluster process interpretation [31] are put forth with little initial attempt to apply them to terrorist activity, but more importantly they are stationary processes (stochastically), and accurately reflect the theoretical understanding of the role behavioural contagion plays in the rate of terrorist incidents.
Diffusion is distinguished from contagion in [48] by identifying it as the increase in the rate of events due to non-terrorist events that elicit a collective reaction among individuals in a population without observation or communication of others' behaviour. This is distinct from contagion as it contains no element of imitation or †The definition of terrorism is contested (see [67] [35] , for an entré into this discussion), in this paper the term "terrorist" and "terrorism" refer only to the fact that the events analysed in this paper are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database [53] .
‡The distinction between diffusion and contagion can be difficult to discern in the sociological literature. In some cases the terms seem to be used interchangeably. This is specifically acknowledged in [48] which concludes by drawing a distinction between the two mechanisms.
the modelling of behaviour, rather it implies a shift in an individual's personal beliefs and attitudes in reaction to external events. If these shifts in patterns of behaviour are enduring, then the mean of the process can shift, implying the possibility that diffusion can be a non-stationary process. Originally, [48] applied this theoretical model, in conjunction with contagion, to explain the spread of riots in US cities during the late 1960's. But it is reasonable to extend this to terrorism more broadly, as diffusion in [48] is what [13] refers to as precipitants, or precipitating events, identified as an element in the spread of terrorism. The resulting theoretical model states that terrorism spreads through two mechanisms: contagion, which is a function of the influence that past terrorist events has on the future event rate, and diffusion, which is a function of exogenous events or processes. This serves as the basis for the model presented in this paper, which demonstrates a model for the combined effects of diffusion and contagion as a convolution of two process: a non-homogeneous Poisson process for diffusion (as originally proposed in [50] ) and a negative-binomial Hawkes self-exciting process for contagion. Results show that under the cluster process representation the model can identify distinct behaviours in the two processes providing useful insight into the actual phenomenon and data.
The balance of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the model is derived as a Bayesian hierarchical model for the convolution of a Poisson and negative-binomial processes. Section 3 presents details of the application of the model to multiple data sets, and in Section 4 results are presented. Section 5 contains a discussion of the results and their interpretation.
Model
The daily number of terrorist events can be described as the sum of events from two processes, a diffusion process and a contagion process. As proposed in [48] a Poisson distribution is used for the diffusion process and a negativebinomial distribution is used for the contagion process, resulting in a convolution model for the total number of daily events. A closed form for the likelihood of a Poisson-Negative-Binomial convolution is not available. This is addressed by using a Bayesian hierarchical model that facilitates computation by exploiting the relationship between the Poisson, gamma, and negative-binomial distributions.
A Hierarchical Model for the Convolution of Diffusion and Contagion Processes
Evaluating a model for the convolution of two Poisson processes is straightforward, as it is simply another Poisson process with an explicit and easily evaluated likelihoood. However, preliminary data analysis confirms [48] that data from the contagion process are better fit using a negative binomial distribution. The resulting PoissonNegative-Binomial convolution model has no closed form likelihood function, complicating analysis. This complication is addressed by noting that the total number of events on day t, Y t = Y Y t , but instead uses the partitioned data with (1) and (4) to draw samples from the posterior distributions of their parameters. Details of the implementation are in Section 3.
Incorporating Exogenous and Endogenous Effects
The model presented in (1)-(4) can be extended to allow variation in diffusion and contagion rates due to other factors. [26] divides these factors into endogenous, associated with the contagion process (e.g., timing, casualties, attack characteristics), and exogenous effects that influence the diffusion process (e.g., what [13] refers to as precipitating events or preconditions); thus exogenous effects are present in the diffusion process and endogenous effects in the contagion process.
Following the convention for generalised linear models, the rate of the diffusion process is therefore modelled
where the row vector x t contains the exogenous covariates at time t and β is a column vector of coefficients. The expected rate of the contagion process µ c t from (3) is
The decay function g(·; φ) is a non-negative function defined for the days u ∈ N such that ∞ 1 g(u) = 1, in this instance a shifted negative-binomial pmf parametrised in terms of mean and scale as in [58, 78] is used. The endogenous effects coefficient δ s is equal to the expected number of additional events generated by each event on day s. As δ s ≥ 0 in general the effects of covariates can be incorporated as in (6) defining
where w s is a row vector of endogenous covariates at time s and η a column vector of coefficients; thus the contagion rate µ c t is the average of the number of events prior to time t scaled by the endogenous effects coefficient and weighted by the decay function g.
It is useful to note that the conditional expectation of Y t
is similar to the Hawkes self-exciting process intensity function [30, 29] , but extends it by allowing λ d t and δ s to vary according to the exogenous and endogenous effects.
Selecting Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
The covariates x t for the endogenous effects can be defined based on known precipitating events or specified in order to allow a data-driven approximation, allowing the model to be used for exploratory purposes. In this paper penalised b-splines [45] are used for this purpose. Endogenous effects are based on characteristics of events that affect their "contagiousness". Exploratory data analysis led to the selection of the number of fatalities as the variable describing the endogenous effects. The exact nature of the relationship between fatalities and contagiousness is not clear, therefore the covariates w s in (8) are defined as a penalised b-spline basis based on the natural log of the number of fatalities (plus 1), allowing a data-driven exploration of the relationship.
Computation and Implementation
As discussed in Section 2 the data can be partitioned stochastically using (5) at each iteration of an MCMC scheme to sample from the posterior distribution of the model parameters. The MCMC scheme can be completed given prior distributions for the parameters φ, β, η and σ 2 .
Priors
The likelihood for the partitioned data are derived from (1) and (4), and the Bayesian model is completed by specifying prior distributions for the parameters. The parameters β and η are given penalised first-order random walk priors as defined in [45] to encourage parsimony and discourage over-fitting.
where K and B are first-order random walk penalty matrices, e.g.
Vague proper gamma distributions are specified as conjugate hyper-priors for ρ and γ as suggested in [45] . The remaining priors are
Computation
Mixture models can be difficult to evaluate as identifiability issues can cause poor mixing or convergence of MCMC chains [64] . This is addressed using additional re-sampling steps for β and η as suggested in [65] . For example, for β at the ith iteration:
The value α is chosen to set the acceptance rate to between 20% -40%, as recommended in [65] . The rest of the implementation is a straightforward Gibbs' MCMC scheme using a hit-and-run sampler with slice sampling [69] for those parameters without conjugate conditional posterior distributions.
Results
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source, publicly available dataset that contains records of terrorist events from 1970 [52] , containing as at its most recent reporting year, 2016, over 170,000 cases each with up to 120 variables. GTD data from the period 2000-2016 from the countries of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, shown in Figures 1, 5 , and 9 were analysed using the model derived in Sections 2 and 3. Results indicate that the diffusion and contagion processes are identifiable and demonstrate distinct patterns that align with theoretical constructs and the historical narrative. Furthermore, the model suggests that the excitation effect varies significantly with the number of fatalities. The diffusion rate is quite low in the period of de facto Taliban rule over a majority of Afghanistan from 1998 until the initial US-led invasion in October 2001 [60] . After the invasion, activity begins to slowly increase as the Taliban began re-organising and re-grouping, and beginning an insurgency and engaging in guerilla warfare [74, 21] . By 2006 US forces were replaced by NATO coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, with the goal of forming Provincial Reconstructions Teams to begin rebuilding Afghanistan and stabilise the political situation [2] . Multiple operations by US and NATO forces to push Taliban forces out of the provinces met with varying degrees of success over the next few years as the US increased troop levels by over 80% in an attempt to defeat the Taliban [55] . Despite these efforts, by the end of 2009 the Taliban's strength had returned to near pre-invasion levels [56] and intelligence showed a steady increase in security incidents [4] . A slight decrease in the rate of incidents in 2010 coincides with the initiation of peace talks with the Haqqani network by Hamid Kharzai in March of 2010 and the Afghan Peace Jirga [61] . Increases in US troop levels continued in 2010 as part of a "surge" strategy with shift to target Taliban leadership resulting in the capture or killing of more than 900 low-to mid-level Taliban leaders [76] . There is a sharp upturn in µ [44] , followed by similar announcements and withdrawals by other coalition members. As the diffusion rate continued to increase, in May of 2012 NATO coalition members endorsed an exit strategy transferring responsibility for security to Afghan forces by mid-2013 [62, 18] which occurred on 18 June 2013 [34] . On 26 October 2014 Britain and the US formally ended their combat operations, handing over their last remaining bases to Afghan control [70, 40] . The contagion process is best explored in detail through the concepts of volatility and resilience as defined in [79] . Volatility is the expected number of events that occur via contagion after each event, this is parametrised as δ s . Figure 3 shows the median and 95% credible interval for the endogenous effects coefficient δ s as a function of the number of fatalities due to events at time s. When the expected volatility is greater than 1, each event is expected to produce more than one subsequent event and the contagion process becomes non-stationary or "explosive". The values for the median of δ s provide evidence of a stationary contagion process (i.e. a volatility consistently less than 1). There is an upward trend in the excitation effect for events with greater than 50 fatalities, but the limited amount of data reflected in the large credible intervals at the limits, makes it difficult to verify. Considering the number of fatalities as a measure of attack size, and an indirect measure of the resources allocated towards an attack, δ s becomes a measure of operational capability. Assuming that large attacks are a substantial drain on resources to mount future attacks, then δ s would be expected to decrease with the number of fatalities. The fact that it is approximately constant would seem to indicate that large attacks are not a significant drain on resources or capacity. The increase in frequency and lethality of attacks over time, indicated by the near constant values of δ s , reflects the Taliban's resurgence during this time period. The parameters of the decay function g(·) (see 2. describe resilience, or the duration and intensity of the contagion effect. The contagion effect can be explained using the language of [31] describing the self-exciting model as a cluster process where events serve as a "parent" producing "children" through the contagion process (which subsequently become "parents" have "children" of their own). The decay function for Afghanistan in Figure 4 (median with 95% credible interval) shows that the duration of the contagion effect of an event is limited to a few days. The expected time until a "child" event (i.e. an event attributed to the contagion effect of a previous, or "parent" event) is between 1.46 and 1.70 days after the "parent" event (95% credible interval) with an expected value of 1.6 days. The probability of a "child" event occurring more than 3 days after the originating event is less than 0.05. Figure 6 shows the posterior median and 95% credible interval for the diffusion rate µ the Iraq Multinational Force, Gen. David Petraeus [9] . In March of 2007 the Iraqi Parliament enacted legislation calling on the US to set a timetable for withdrawal of their forces [59] . By September of 2007 plans were in place to reduce US troop levels to pre-surge numbers [20] . On The variation in volatility as a function of fatalities, as shown in Figure 7 , is pronounced. There is an obvious trend indicating that volatility decreases as the number of fatalities increases. The model suggests that events producing a large number of fatalities tend to generate almost no contagion effects. However, for events causing 0 or 1 fatalities the median value of δ s is greater than 1 indicating that the contagion is potentially in a nonstationary, explosive state. The trend for the frequency of events and the number of fatalities is not as strong as it is in Afghanistan, and there are 38 events with over 100 fatalities, leading to a narrower credible interval at the extremes for δ s . This paints a different picture of the operational capacity. Rather than the steady increase as seen in Afghanistan by the resurgence of the Taliban, a power vacuum was created after the invasion. The coalition forces outlawed the ethnic minority Ba'ath party and the disbanded the Iraqi armed forces, many of whom were eventually integrated into the Islamic State [68] . Initially, the resistance to the occupation had no central unifying entity, and it wasn't until the rise of the Islamic State post-2010 and their subsequent assimilation of other resistance groups that a similar unified force against the occupation existed [39] . This explains both the decrease in volatility with casualties, and the non-stationarity for events with 0 or 1 fatality. The resilience of activity in Iraq is described in the decay function g(·) shown in Figure 8 (median with 95% credible interval) and the parameters of the function g(·). The duration of contagion is limited to a few days, the expected time until a contagion event is 1.4 (1.31, 1.47) days and the probability of a contagion event occurring more than 3 days after the originating event is less that 0.05.
Iraq

Israel
The history, context, and model results for Israel differ from those of Afghanistan and Iraq. This is reflected in Figure 10 showing the posterior median and 95% credible interval of µ significant variation in the diffusion rate, but it never reaches the intensity of Afghanistan and Iraq. There are numerous events that could be identified as possible precipitants, a few have been noted here that align with the data to provide some reference to the results. There is a steep increase in µ The variation of the volatility as measured by δ s for events in Israel follows a similar decreasing pattern as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The volatility never exceeds 1 indicating that the contagion process is stationary. While the number of fatalities per event tends to increase over time in Afghanistan, it is decreasing in Israel over the same period. The decay function in Figure 12 (median with 95% credible interval) shows that the duration of contagion in Israel is limited to a few days. Specifically, the expected time until a contagion event is around 1.6 (1.39, 1.82) days and the probability of a contagion event occurring more than 4 days after the originating event is less that 0.05.
Discussion
Results from the models provide two immediately evident results: in general, key shifts in the diffusion rate coincide with key events in the historical narrative; that is the notion of precipitants as exogenous factors is evident in the models, and endogenous excitation effects tends to decrease as the number of fatalities increase. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel each prevent different contemporary and historical contexts, which is reflected in in the analyses of their data from the GTD using the model presented here. The results for all three countries agree with the existing narratives. Both Afghanistan and Iraq were under the rule of repressive regimes prior to invasion by US and Allied forces. Occupation rule in both countries resulted in increased violence which escalated rapidly after the withdrawal of forces and the ceding of authority for security to local forces. The difference between the two is that resistance in Afghanistan came primarily in the form of a reassertion of the deposed regime, the Taliban. In Iraq the regime of Saddam Hussein, including the Iraqi army and his Ba'ath party, were systematically dismantled in an effort to create a democratic secular government, creating a power vacuum and exacerbating sectarian tensions between the Shia majority and Sunni minority, contributing to the violence and unrest. This difference is manifest in the differences in the endogenous effects or volatility as measured by α s in Figures 3 and 7 . The volatility in Afghanistan is relatively constant, with little decrease or change with the number of fatalities, this indicates that there is likely no inhibitory or "blow-back" effects for large scale events. Coupled with the information that the fatalities and frequency of events both increase in time (as the Taliban consolidates and rebuilds post-invasion) the stable volatility also indicates there there is no evidence that the execution of large-scale events is not an excessive drain on resources or capacity to attack. In Iraq the volatility shows more variation, as α s decreases with the number of fatalities. The volatility in excess of 1 for events with 1 or 0 fatalities reflects that numerous groups or individuals were responsible for the events. The decrease in volatility with fatalities reflects either an inhibitory effect for large scale events, or the limited resources of groups or individuals to act. In either case the distinction between these patterns is informative.
The pattern in Israel reflects a relatively stable situation, where terrorist activity ebbs and flows. A precarious peace process exists between Israeli and Palestinian claims over the region. Describing the situation as complex is an understatement. In reality, the Israelis and Palestinians share not only claims of sovereignty over the region, but also cultural and economic ties. The ebb and flow of terrorist activity is a part of daily life and exists almost as an extension of political discourse. Increases in activity often result in new rounds of negotiation, or at least proportional responses rather than all-out offences. This is reflected in both the variation of the diffusion rate µ d t , which does not reach the levels of intensity as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the volatility which is consistently less than 1, indicating a stationary process, and the decrease in volatility as a function of fatalities. Given the relatively low diffusion rate, and the historical context, where violence is often used as a negotiating tool, it is more likely that the decrease in volatility as fatalities increase is likely due to an inhibitory effect.
The classification of mechanisms for the spread of terrorist activity into the categories of diffusion and contagion provides a useful framework for analysing activity. The intent in developing these mathematical models was to create a means of both analysing and classifying data, but also to test and measure the effectiveness of countermeasures. The correspondence between the model results and the existing narratives for the countries analysed validate the use of these models, both conceptually and mathematically.The validation of these models also has important implications for counter-measures. First is the distinction between endogenous and exogenous effects, and their roles in the contagion and diffusion processes. Second is the implication that the dominant mechanism should guide counter-measures, both counter-terrorism efforts and counter-radicalisation efforts. The contagion process is characterised by small-scale dynamics and is governed by endogenous effects, i.e. it is the characteristics of these events and immediate or tactical counter-measures that have influence over the contagion process. The diffusion process is associated with exogenous factors, or large-scale socio-economic and political factors, these are factors that take a different, more strategic set of counter-measures, in order to effect change. Both of these cases require different approaches, a more tactical approach to addressing factors that effect the contagion process, and a more strategic approach is required to address factors effecting the diffusion process. If, as is likely, real-world situations are a mixture of both diffusion and contagion then counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies should be shaped to address the two processes and their particular balance in each setting. The models here provide a useful tool for analysis to both assess the mechanisms at work in any given context and to measure the effectiveness of enacted counter measures. In practice, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation activities typically have the possibility of negative consequences, an effective measure of both what measures are needed and their effectiveness is important to minimising potential negative effects. Thus the utility of the models proposed here is beyond academic and offer substantial benefit to real-world policy makers.
